# Regulatory Frameworks for AI Governance: Why the Global South Must Play a Central Role

.

Oluwanifise Samuel Adeleke*

**Abstract**

The global governance of artificial intelligence (AI) cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past. Today, AI policies remain heavily shaped by the Global North, reinforcing historical power imbalances in technology, data control, and economic benefits, while sidelining the needs and contexts of the Global South. This article, through critical analysis of existing governance structures and comparative assessment of policy approaches, argues that equitable AI governance is impossible without centring the Global South's voices, priorities, and lived realities. By examining the colonial roots of this exclusion, the piece exposes how current frameworks risk cementing a new era of technological dependency rather than fostering justice.

The findings are clear: token representation is insufficient. The Global South requires real resources, i.e., capacity building, infrastructure, and technical support, to participate meaningfully in shaping AI's future. Crucially, homegrown AI ecosystems must be nurtured to ensure self-determination, not another cycle of extraction. Regional collaborations across the Global South could amplify shared demands, while proactive engagement with Northern policymakers must challenge the status quo.

Ultimately, the path forward demands action from both sides. The Global North must move beyond performative inclusion and redistribute power; the Global South must invest aggressively in local research, policy infrastructure, and transnational solidarity. Only through this dual commitment can AI governance become truly global—serving humanity, not just its most privileged corners.

**Key Words**

AI governance, Global South, regulatory frameworks, digital equity, policy inclusion, technological development.

## 1. Introduction

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has rapidly progressed in the last decade. The year 2023 saw the ascendancy of the promise and the perils of AI.[1] In 2024, generative and general-purpose AI dominated global discourse, sparking unprecedented interest, debate, and momentum in technological innovation and regulatory discussions.[2] The transformative potential of AI

* PhD Student, Faculty of Business Law and Politics, University of Hull, Hull Law School. Email: o.s.adeleke-2021@hull.ac.uk.



[1] Igarapé Institute, 'Global Futures Bulletin: Responsible Artificial Intelligence Efforts In the Global South - Instituto Igarapé' 3 <https://igarape.org.br/en/global-futures-bulletin-responsible-artificial-intelligence-efforts-in-the-global-south/> accessed 30 November 2024.

[2] ibid.

became a central narrative, driving conversations across technology, policy, and innovation sectors worldwide.

AI is already embedded in everyday life; from our mobile operating systems to our smart devices and virtual assistants like Alexa and Siri, AI is seemingly everywhere.[3] In science, we are experiencing significant breakthroughs in medical diagnostics,[4] drug discovery[5] and climate research.[6] AI is also transforming global markets with millions of dollars flowing through AI-influenced economic transformations.[7] Moreover, in the area of international security, AI is revolutionising military strategies through advanced logistics, intelligence gathering, and emerging technologies such as: autonomous weapon systems, automated targeting capabilities, drone warfare, as well as sophisticated cyber-attack mechanisms.[8]

Notwithstanding, it is important to remember the risks and limitations associated with AI.[9] These concerns are shared by both ordinary peoples from different walks of life, as well as experts alike.[10] AI is a powerful tool because it allows humans to accomplish more with less: less time, education and equipment.[11] However, it is these same capabilities that make it dangerous in the wrong hands. Even humans with entirely good intentions can prompt AIs to produce bad outcomes.[12] Some existing risks that AI poses include harmful malfunctions, discrimination, reduced social connections, invasions of privacy and disinformation. Future advancements could exacerbate anticipated catastrophic risks, including bioterrorism, misuse of concentrated power, nuclear and conventional war, amongst many others.[13] The report from the UK's Government Office for Science also underscores some disruptive potential risks such as, mis- or disinformation and deepfakes, cyber-attacks, reduced barriers to access harmful information and fraud.[14] These concerns underscore the critical importance of AI regulation and governance frameworks. As the UN Secretary-General's High-level Advisory

---

[3] Jurriaan van Mil and João Pedro Quintais, 'A Matter of (Joint) Control? Virtual Assistants and the General Data Protection Regulation' (2022) 45 Computer Law & Security Review 105689, 1–2.

[4] Gehendra Mahara and others, 'Revolutionising Health Care: Exploring the Latest Advances in Medical Sciences' 13 Journal of Global Health 03042, 1–5; Shuroug A Alowais and others, 'Revolutionizing Healthcare: The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Clinical Practice' (2023) 23 BMC Medical Education 689, 3–7.

[5] MKG Abbas and others, 'The Role of AI in Drug Discovery' (2024) 25 ChemBioChem e202300816, 1–4; Rizwan Qureshi and others, 'AI in Drug Discovery and Its Clinical Relevance' (2023) 9 Heliyon 2–17 <https://www.cell.com/heliyon/abstract/S2405-8440(23)04783-7> accessed 31 March 2025.

[6] Josh Cowls and others, 'The AI Gambit: Leveraging Artificial Intelligence to Combat Climate Change—Opportunities, Challenges, and Recommendations' (2023) 38 AI & Society 283, 284–286.

[7] 'PDF' 3 <https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/issues/analytics/assets/pwc-ai-analysis-sizing-the-prize-report.pdf> accessed 31 March 2025.

[8] Ben Buchanan, 'The AI Triad and What It Means for National Security Strategy' (Center for Security and Emerging Technology 2020) V <https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/the-ai-triad-and-what-it-means-for-national-security-strategy/> accessed 19 November 2024.

[9] Eric Schmidt, 'This Is How AI Will Transform the Way Science Gets Done' [2023] *MIT Technology* <https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/07/05/1075865/eric-schmidt-ai-will-transform-science/> accessed 19 November 2024.

[10] Baobao Zhang and Allan Dafoe, 'Artificial Intelligence: American Attitudes and Trends' [2019] SSRN Electronic Journal <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3312874> accessed 19 November 2024; 'International Scientific Report on the Safety of Advanced AI: Interim Report' (*GOV.UK*) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/international-scientific-report-on-the-safety-of-advanced-ai/international-scientific-report-on-the-safety-of-advanced-ai-interim-report> accessed 19 November 2024.

[11] Schmidt (n 9).

[12] ibid.

[13] Adam Jones, 'What Risks Does AI Pose?' (*BlueDot Impact*, 21 February 2024) <https://aisafetyfundamentals.com/blog/ai-risks/> accessed 22 November 2024.

[14] Department for Science, Innovation & Technology, 'Future Risks of Frontier AI (Annex A)' (*GOV.UK*) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/frontier-ai-capabilities-and-risks-discussion-paper/future-risks-of-frontier-ai-annex-a> accessed 24 November 2024.

Body emphasises, AI's transboundary nature demands a global approach that transcends market interests.[15] The need for a strong, internationally coordinated AI governance is "irrefutable", and requires collective oversight beyond fragmented national or corporate strategies.[16] However, the lack of technical capability as well as the pace of development has greatly slowed down regulatory frameworks and policies in this field, despite the urgency to do so.[17]

When it comes to AI policies and governance across the globe, there is a fundamental imbalance, with a handful of states from the Global North, e.g., the United States; states from the European Union, and China dominating the regulatory discourse.[18] These regions or states not only lead in the development of AI policy and practice, but also set and establish AI rules and practices that others adopt either formally or informally.[19] However, such rules and practices may ignore the needs, capacities and unique perspectives of developing states or Global South States.[20] As a result of this regulatory asymmetry, there is a potent risk of creating a technological governance model that perpetuates existing global inequalities that can marginalize developing nations and leave them disadvantaged without meaningful contributions into AI's transformative potential, governance and societal implications. This in turn can lower the trust in AI.[21] Already, there is a high distrust in AI from the Global South.[22] It is, therefore, necessary to take an inclusive approach to the public understanding and the management of risks associated with AI technologies so that there can be a better account for the range of AI risks globally.

Charles Correa has pointed out the fundamental flaw in transplanting solutions across different contexts.[23] Just as a house designed for the cold climates of Northern Europe will not be suitable for the warm regions of the Global South, so too will AI governance paradigms from the Global North that ignore local contexts be unsuitable for the Global South.[24] This underscores the need for an understanding of our different cultural and socioeconomic realities before developing a global governance framework.

The perspective of the Global South in AI governance is necessary for developing an equitable and sustainable regulatory framework that is truly transnational in nature. Diverse perspectives from the Global South are essential to address the unique technological challenges, cultural contexts and socioeconomic realities that may not be easily seen or understood by the frameworks from the Global North. Including the perspective of the Global South in AI governance and safety frameworks will not only ensure global diversity and mitigate potential harm, but will prevent technological colonialism, and create a robust, flexible regulation that

---

[15] UN AI Advisory Body, "'Irrefutable" Need for Global Regulation of AI: UN Experts' (19 September 2024) <https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/09/1154541> accessed 28 November 2024.
[16] ibid.
[17] Esmat Zaidan and Imad Antoine Ibrahim, 'AI Governance in a Complex and Rapidly Changing Regulatory Landscape: A Global Perspective' (2024) 11 Humanities and Social Sciences Communications 1, 1.
[18] Gordon LaForge, Robert Muggah and Gabriella Seiler, 'Bridging the AI Governance Divide' (New America (Planetary Politics Initiative) 2024) 4 <http://newamerica.org/planetary-politics/policy-papers/bridging-the-ai-governance-divide/> accessed 22 November 2024.
[19] Institute (n 1) 3.
[20] ibid 3,6.
[21] Aubra Anthony, Lakshmee Sharma and Elina Noor, 'Advancing a More Global Agenda for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence' (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2024) <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/04/advancing-a-more-global-agenda-for-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence?lang=en> accessed 22 November 2024.
[22] Lloyd's Register Foundation, 'The World Is Split on Its Trust in Artificial Intelligence' [2022] *LR Foundation* <https://wrp.lrfoundation.org.uk/news/the-world-is-split-on-its-trust-in-artificial-intelligence> accessed 1 December 2024.
[23] Charles Correa, *'A Place in the Sun' in A Place in the Shade* (Penguin Global 2012).
[24] ibid.

will reflect the different realities and needs of a truly global majority and technological ecosystem.[25]

The meaningful integration of the Global South is critical to developing AI regulatory frameworks that are truly global, equitable, and responsive to diverse technological and societal needs.[26] Only by centring the perspectives, challenges, and innovative potential of developing nations can we create comprehensive AI governance that transcends the limited viewpoints of technological powerhouses and ensures fair, context-aware policy development. Accordingly, the essence of this paper is to examine the growing disparity in AI regulation between the Global North and South and to propose recommendations that ensure the Global South is not left behind in the evolving AI landscape.

## 2. Global South and North

The essence of this section is to understand the key terms that will frequently be employed in this article. This section will not concern itself with broader issues that relate to these terminologies but will focus majorly on the meaning of the terminologies within the context of AI governance.

The term 'Global South and North' does not necessarily denote hemispheric or geographical divisions,[27] even though it may in some sense relate to the regions. In the context of the discussion on AI, the Global South is seen to be the experiences of populations who are excluded, silenced or marginalised and disproportionately impacted by technology.[28] They often encounter unique challenges with AI and data systems.[29] On the other hand, the Global North are the dominant states on AI and data systems who set the global narrative around AI. For example, Global South refers to the regions of Africa, Asia, Latin America and Oceania, whereas the Global North refers to Europe and North America.[30] The terms refer to the framework for analysing the relative prosperity and international power of states globally.[31] The terms gained prominence after the Cold War.[32] In simple terms, the Global North refers to stable states and economies, while Global South refers to economically disadvantaged states.[33]

While these terminologies are seen to be better than previously employed terms such as the three-world system and the developed and developing countries system,[34] they are in some sense still a function of the same political, epistemic, economic, and moral hierarchies that

[25] Anthony, Sharma and Noor (n 21).
[26] LaForge, Muggah and Seiler (n 18) 5.
[27] Martin Müller, 'In Search of the Global East: Thinking between North and South' (2020) 25 Geopolitics 734, 735.
[28] ibid 734–735.
[29] Marie-Therese Png, 'At the Tensions of South and North: Critical Roles of Global South Stakeholders in AI Governance', *Proceedings of the 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency* (Association for Computing Machinery 2022) 1434–1435 <https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533200> accessed 18 December 2025.
[30] Danica Anne Sims, 'When I Say … Global South and Global North' (2024) 58 Medical Education 286.
[31] Müller (n 27) 734–735.
[32] Png (n 29) 1434.
[33] ibid 1434–1435.
[34] Kenny Miles, 'Global North and Global South', *Encyclopaedia Britannica* <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Global-North-and-Global-South> accessed 28 December 2024.

were established during the European colonisation.[35] The only difference is that today these hierarchies are more de-territorialised.[36]

The terms described above have often been used to dichotomise the world into the haves and have nots. Though the term has consistently changed since colonial times, every new term continues to imply an inherent unevenness.[37] Santos articulates this perfectly by opining that the South is not a geographic concept but is a metaphor for human suffering that is caused by capitalism and colonialism on a global scale.[38] It goes to show how colonialism is deeply embedded in how states view themselves. Milan has also stated that the South must be understood as a 'plural entity' that encompasses 'the different, the underprivileged, the alternative, the resistant, the invisible, and the subversive'.[39]

Having said that, there is no easy way out. It is difficult to have a global language standard that will adequately describe differences and categories, given our differing valid positionalities.[40] This is what has precisely informed this topic. Within the context of AI, perhaps the best way to address this is to recognise that every region is entitled to create its own standards based on its specific development, experience and understanding.[41] Besides, there needs to be a fundamental shift to a more inclusive and equitable AI governance that challenges these entrenched hierarchies and ensures that all regions have a meaningful role in shaping the future of AI.

## 3. The Current AI Regulatory Landscape

While the discussions about AI governance and safety have primarily taken place in the abstract, AI has now entered into the mainstream and states are now formulating different plans and policies regarding AI and ethics. Fundamentally, states are the most relevant subjects in the international fora.[42] As major actors, they have the authority to agree and determine regulations domestically, as well as enter into treaties on the international scene that binds states together.[43] When there are incidences of violations of such regulations, states can easily hold themselves accountable for their actions or lack of especially in the context of AI and how things can evolve rapidly.[44]

Even though there is a growing need for a global regulation on AI, dialogue and collaboration amongst states is slower than desired.[45] This may be because of the increasing sophistication and Interconnectedness of AI systems.[46] Notwithstanding, states need to urgently address

---

[35] Png (n 29) 1435.
[36] ibid.
[37] Themrise Khan and others, 'How We Classify Countries and People—and Why It Matters' (2022) 7 BMJ Global Health <https://gh.bmj.com/content/7/6/e009704> accessed 28 December 2024.
[38] Boaventura de Sousa Santos, 'Epistemologies of the South and the Future' (2016) 1 From the European South 17, 18.
[39] Stefania Milan and Emiliano Treré, 'Big Data from the South(s): Beyond Data Universalism' (2019) 20 Television & New Media 319, 321.
[40] Khan and others (n 37).
[41] ibid.
[42] Simon Chesterman, *We, the Robots?: Regulating Artificial Intelligence and the Limits of the Law* (Cambridge University Press 2021) 4; Zaidan and Ibrahim (n 17) 5.
[43] Zaidan and Ibrahim (n 17) 5.
[44] ibid; Edith Brown Weiss, 'International Law in a Kaleidoscopic World' [2011] Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works 26–32 <https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1622>.
[45] Zaidan and Ibrahim (n 17) 6.
[46] ibid.

these systems and its increasing activities because of the potential for these systems to affect states, their sovereignty and their social, cultural, economic and political norms.[47]

The establishment of a truly international AI governance framework is riddled with several complexities such as institutional barriers, the fragmented nature of international law, different geopolitical realities, human rights, economic considerations, and slow decision-making processes globally.[48] These are challenging themes to get past in a bid for a global framework. Besides, it will seem that states have different priorities when it comes to AI regulation. For some, domestic leadership on AI appears to be the priority, with international collaboration taking a back seat.[49] Moreover, only a few states have the technological and financial resources to participate in this debate.[50]

Together, all of these challenges highlight the difficulties in crafting a globally acceptable paradigm for AI regulation. The path to achieving a global regulation requires nuanced diplomatic efforts, shared understanding, trust, and the willingness to balance national interests with global cooperation. For now, AI regulation globally is fraught with significant national divergencies, with states pursuing their own strategy that prioritises individual competitive advantages over collaborative governance.[51] One example of this trend is evident in the approaches of major technological powers like China and the United States, which are reluctant to engage in comprehensive international regulatory frameworks.[52] Instead of global discussions and international agreements, states are predominantly focused on creating domestic regulations that provide their technological companies strategic advantages in the rapidly evolving global AI competition.[53] This approach only serves to fragment any potential unified global governance efforts and also risks creating a fragmented global technological ecosystem.

While the Global North have made some strides and continue to achieve groundbreaking regulations in shaping the rules on AI, it would seem that the Global South, comprising of areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, some Central and South Asian countries, and some Latin American countries are lagging behind. The aspiration is to have a truly global regulation that reflects the perspectives and unique contexts of all states.[54] However, if the current AI regulation and governance trend is not averted, it will exacerbate the global inequalities in the near term.[55]

In 2020, a survey conducted by the Global Partnership on AI and the Future Society identified 214 initiatives addressing AI ethics, governance, and social good across thirty-eight countries and regions. Notably, initiatives originating in Europe and North America accounted for 58 per cent of the total, underscoring the pronounced geographical concentration of norm-setting

---

[47] Hazrat Usman, Bushra Nawaz and Saiqa Naseer, 'The Future of State Sovereignty in the Age of Artificial Intelligence' [2023] Social Studies 142–150.
[48] Zaidan and Ibrahim (n 17) 6.
[49] Pekka Ala-Pietilä and Nathalie A Smuha, 'A Framework for Global Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence and Its Governance' (Social Science Research Network, 1 September 2020) 7 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3696519> accessed 15 December 2024.
[50] Margarita Robles Carrillo, 'Artificial Intelligence: From Ethics to Law' (2020) 44 Telecommunications Policy 101937, 5.
[51] Ala-Pietilä and Smuha (n 49) 8.
[52] Zaidan and Ibrahim (n 17) 6.
[53] Ala-Pietilä and Smuha (n 49) 7.
[54] Ethan Teo, Ewan Lusty and Giacomo Borsetti, 'AI beyond the Global North: A New Battleground for Influence' (*Flint Global*) <https://flint-global.com/blog/ai-beyond-the-global-north-a-new-battleground-for-influence/> accessed 2 December 2024.
[55] Gordon LaForge, 'The Dangers of Imposing Global North Approaches to AI Governance on the Global South | TechPolicy.Press' (*Tech Policy Press*, 5 September 2024) <https://techpolicy.press/the-dangers-of-imposing-global-north-approaches-to-ai-governance-on-the-global-south> accessed 2 December 2024.

efforts in these regions.[56] This highlights the limited global representation in AI policy and governance. Similarly, in 2022, North America accounted for about 40 percent of global AI revenue with less than 8 percent of the global population.[57] In a review prepared by New America and the Igarape Institute for G20, it was found that out of nearly 500 AI policies, standards and guidelines developed from 2011 through 2023, two-thirds originated in the US, Europe, or China, while only 7 percent came from Latin America and Africa.[58] This review underscores the gross AI governance imbalance and starkly reveals the marginalization of Global South perspectives from AI regulatory frameworks. It, therefore, calls for an urgent need for a much more inclusive and globally representative approach to AI governance.

Current AI governance models operate within a fragmented, heterogenous ecology that is characterised by dispersed AI regulatory frameworks and actors.[59] This makes the model on AI governance to be lacking in global inclusivity and ultimately reveals ideological differences that fails to provide a truly universal representative approach to AI regulation.[60] It is, therefore, necessary to give an overview of major states/regions and their approaches to AI governance. Such an overview will give an insight into current regulatory happenings and how to spell out a case for including the perspectives of the Global South.

## 4. The Global North

### The United States

While the United States plans to establish dedicated AI legislation and federal regulatory oversight, it currently relies on a combination of existing federal laws and guidelines to regulate AI.[61] As a result, developers and deployers of AI systems increasingly face complex patchworks of state and local regulations that creates compliance challenges and inconsistencies with standards across the globe.[62] In recent congressional sessions, the United States has enacted its first federal AI laws, either as standalone legislation or as provisions within broader acts.[63] Key examples include the National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act of 2020, which launched a national AI initiative, and the AI in Government Act and Advancing American AI Act, which tasked federal agencies with driving AI policies.[64]

Recent developments highlight a growing policy focus. In 2023, the White House released its Blueprint for an AI Bill of Rights, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology introduced an AI Risk Management Framework.[65] Midyear, the SAFE Innovation Framework for AI Policy and the Blumenthal & Hawley Comprehensive AI Framework were proposed to

---

[56] Anthony, Sharma and Noor (n 21).
[57] ibid.
[58] LaForge, Muggah and Seiler (n 18); LaForge (n 55).
[59] Marta Galceran-Vercher, 'Artificial Intelligence and Cities: The Global Race to Regulate Algorithms' (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) 2023) 286 2–3 <https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/artificial-intelligence-and-cities-global-race-regulate-algorithms-0> accessed 2 December 2024.
[60] Galceran-Vercher (n 59).
[61] Marcin Szczepański, 'United States Approach to Artificial Intelligence |' (European Parliamentary Research Service 2024) PE 757.605 <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2024)757605> accessed 30 December 2024.
[62] White & Case LLP, 'AI Watch: Global Regulatory Tracker - United States | White & Case LLP' <https://www.whitecase.com/insight-our-thinking/ai-watch-global-regulatory-tracker-united-states> accessed 1 January 2025.
[63] Szczepański (n 61).
[64] ibid.
[65] ibid.

guide future legislation.[66] At the state level, progress has also been significant. Between 2016 and 2022, 14 states passed AI-related laws, with Maryland leading (7 bills), followed by California (6), and Massachusetts and Washington (5 each).[67] This reflects a multi-level approach to AI governance in the U.S.

President Joe Biden's "Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence," issued in October 2023,[68] marked a pivotal step toward managing AI's risks and promises.[69] It builds on earlier work, like the Executive Order directing agencies to combat algorithmic discrimination and the securing of voluntary commitments from major US companies like Amazon, Google, Meta, Microsoft and OpenAI.[70]

The Biden Order of 2023 sought to place an urgency on governing the development and use of AI safely and responsibly by co-ordinating a Federal Government-wide approach.[71] It aimed to position the United States as a global leader in establishing AI safety standards, safeguarding privacy, advancing equity, and fostering innovation.[72] Central to the Order was ensuring AI systems' safety and trustworthiness before public release. Key provisions included mandating safety test result sharing, emphasizing privacy-preserving techniques, addressing potential algorithmic discrimination, and guiding responsible AI use in critical sectors like healthcare and education. The Executive Order sought to preserve America's AI leadership by supporting research, protecting civil rights, and providing resources for small developers.[73] It represents a comprehensive approach to balancing technological innovation with robust ethical and security considerations.

The Biden Executive Order of 2023 establishes a comprehensive framework for governing AI development and deployment through eight guiding principles.[74] At its core, the order emphasizes that AI systems must be safe and secure while promoting responsible innovation and competition to maintain U.S. leadership in AI development.[75] The framework specifically addresses workforce implications, mandating that AI development must support rather than undermine American workers, while ensuring all AI policies advance equity and civil rights.[76] Moreover, recognizing AI's growing integration into daily life, the order prioritizes consumer protection for Americans who increasingly interact with AI systems.[77] It establishes robust safeguards for privacy and civil liberties, while also setting specific guidelines for the federal government's use of AI to improve public service delivery.[78] Through these principles, the

---

66 ibid.
67 ibid.
68 The White House, 'Executive Order on the Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Development and Use of Artificial Intelligence' (*The White House*, 30 October 2023) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2023/10/30/executive-order-on-the-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-development-and-use-of-artificial-intelligence/> accessed 31 December 2024.
69 The White House, 'Fact Sheet: President Biden Issues Executive Order on Safe, Secure, and Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence' (*The White House*, 30 October 2023) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/10/30/fact-sheet-president-biden-issues-executive-order-on-safe-secure-and-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence/> accessed 2 December 2024; Yoshija Walter, 'Managing the Race to the Moon: Global Policy and Governance in Artificial Intelligence Regulation—A Contemporary Overview and an Analysis of Socioeconomic Consequences' (2024) 4 Discover Artificial Intelligence 14.
70 Szczepański (n 61).
71 House (n 68).
72 Szczepański (n 61).
73 House (n 68).
74 ibid.
75 ibid.
76 Szczepański (n 61).
77 ibid.
78 House (n 68).

Biden Order positions the United States to continue its historical role as a leader in driving global societal, economic, and technological progress.

### Canada

Canada's approach to AI governance has been largely influenced by its closest neighbour, the United States. Nevertheless, it has its own specific path to AI governance.[79] Canada's development of its Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA) is a longstanding effort to create a regulatory environment that is safe, ethical and equitable for the use of AI.[80] Similarly, the introduction of the voluntary AI Code of Conduct is another step that emphasises Canadas approach to ensuring public trust in AI and supporting the success of Canadian AI companies.[81] Moreover, Canada has also committed to developing a cohesive national AI strategy through the Pan-Canadian Artificial Intelligence Strategy. Its aim through the strategy is to harness the potential of AI, promote collaboration and innovation in Canada.[82]

### Europe

The regulatory framework for AI in the European Union is primarily shaped by the EU AI Act, the world's first comprehensive AI law.[83] Proposed by the European Commission in April 2021, the Act categorizes AI systems into various risk levels, offering a structured approach to regulation.[84] Integral to the EU's broader digital strategy, the EU AI Act is designed to establish a robust framework for AI development and deployment. Its goal is to maximize AI's potential in critical sectors like healthcare, transportation, and manufacturing, while simultaneously providing clear guidelines to ensure safe, ethical, and innovative technological advancement.[85]

The European Parliament, through the Act, aims to ensure AI systems are safe, transparent, traceable, non-discriminatory, and environmentally sustainable.[86] A key priority is safeguarding individuals from the potential harms of AI while fostering its beneficial applications. To this end, the Act classifies AI applications into three risk categories: (1) those posing an unacceptable risk, such as government-led social scoring or systems designed for cognitive manipulation, which are outright banned; (2) high-risk applications, including those affecting safety and fundamental rights, which are subject to strict legal requirements; and (3) applications deemed low-risk, which face minimal regulation.[87]

The EU AI Act marks a pivotal milestone in the regulation of emerging technologies. By addressing diverse AI applications—from data prediction and content personalization to

---

[79] Walter (n 69).

[80] Aoun E Muhammad and Kin-Choong Yow, 'Demystifying Canada's Artificial Intelligence and Data Act (AIDA): The Good, the Bad and the Unclear Elements', *2023 IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and Computer Engineering (CCECE)* (2023) <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10288878> accessed 1 January 2025; John Beardwood, 'Heads Up: The Companion Document To The Canadian Artificial Intelligence And Data Act — AIDA Companion Provides Answers to Some Key Questions but Then Raises Others' <https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.9785/cri-2023-240302/html> accessed 1 January 2025; Teresa Scassa, 'Regulating AI in Canada: A Critical Look at the Proposed Artificial Intelligence and Data Act' (2023) 101 The Canadian Bar Review <https://cbr.cba.org/index.php/cbr/article/view/4817> accessed 1 January 2025.

[81] Walter (n 69).

[82] ibid.

[83] Angela Daly and others, 'Artificial Intelligence, Governance and Ethics: Global Perspectives' (Social Science Research Network, 4 July 2019) 190 <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3414805> accessed 6 December 2024.

[84] European Parliament, 'EU AI Act: First Regulation on Artificial Intelligence' (*Topics | European Parliament*, 6 August 2023) <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/en/article/20230601STO93804/eu-ai-act-first-regulation-on-artificial-intelligence> accessed 2 December 2024.

[85] ibid.

[86] Walter (n 69).

[87] ibid.

biometric systems and critical infrastructure—it mirrors the transformative impact of the GDPR in 2018.[88]

Similar to the European states, non-EU countries have also been contemplating how to regulate AI systems effectively. The United Kingdom, for instance, published a White Paper on AI outlining a vision for a "responsible, trustworthy, and innovative" AI ecosystem. The document proposed a regulatory framework that includes the establishment of an AI Centre of Excellence and an AI Ethics Advisory Council.[89] The UK's decision to chart its own path has been significantly influenced by Brexit, which afforded the country the freedom to develop specialized rules for AI independent of EU oversight. However, it remains unclear how the UK's regulatory framework will interact with the European Union's AI regulations, particularly in the context of cross-border AI applications and trade.[90]

Switzerland has also adopted measures to emphasize the responsible development and use of AI.[91] These measures focus on promoting AI research and innovation while addressing ethical and societal concerns. By fostering collaboration between academia and industry, Switzerland's approach aims to balance technological advancement with societal well-being.[92]

In contrast, despite being embroiled in conflict, both Russia and Ukraine have adopted laws and regulations for AI, though these remain limited in scope and fail to comprehensively address societal or ethical concerns. Ukraine's AI strategy, adopted in 2021, closely mirrors Switzerland's emphasis on research, innovation, and ethical considerations.[93] Russia, on the other hand, has focused its regulatory efforts primarily on promoting AI development and use, with little evidence of regulations targeting societal or ethical implications. Both nations have reportedly used AI in their ongoing conflict, particularly for targeting, surveillance, and disinformation campaigns, further complicating the regulatory landscape in these regions.[94]

### China

In the dichotomy of AI governance between the Global South and North, China occupies a complex status. While it may have traditionally belonged to the Global South because of the historical context of its developing economy, it is difficult to see China in that light now.[95] China has become one of the world's biggest economies, a global leader in technology and a major industrial power which aligns more closely with the features of the Global North. Despite this, China still has significant internal disparities that can be associated with characteristics of the Global South. Besides, China often sees itself as an ally of the Global South, often resisting Western ideology.[96] Notwithstanding, China can be viewed as a bridge between the Global North and South. In the matter of AI governance, China operates like a Global North power with its own unique model.

---

[88] Galceran-Vercher (n 59).
[89] Huw Roberts and others, 'Artificial Intelligence Regulation in the United Kingdom: A Path to Good Governance and Global Leadership?' (2023) 12 Internet Policy Review <https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/artificial-intelligence-regulation-united-kingdom-path-good-governance> accessed 1 January 2025.
[90] Walter (n 69).
[91] ibid.
[92] ibid.
[93] ibid.
[94] ibid.
[95] Sarang Shidore, 'China Is Not the Global South' (*Foreign Policy*, 26 December 2024) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/10/10/china-is-not-the-global-south/> accessed 1 January 2025.
[96] Ngor Luong, 'China's AI Governance: Engaging the Global South' (National Bureau of Asian Research 2024) <https://www.nbr.org/publication/chinas-ai-governance-engaging-the-global-south/> accessed 1 January 2025.

China's AI governance reflects a strategic approach balancing technological innovation with state control.[97] Otherwise known as techno-authoritarianism.[98] Since 2017, China has implemented comprehensive AI regulations that prioritize national stability and technological advancement while maintaining distinctive political characteristics.

The New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (2017) outlined strategic AI development objectives across multiple sectors.[99] With this Plan, China's aim is to stimulate high investment in the AI sector over the coming years, with the aim of becoming a world leader in AI innovation.[100] Subsequently, China adopted key regulatory measures: the Personal Information Protection Law (2021), inspired by Europe's GDPR, and a 2022 regulation monitoring recommendation algorithms and deep synthesis technologies.[101]

These regulations provide users specific rights, including algorithm opt-out options and data deletion permissions. However, the framework distinctly embodies China's techno-authoritarian model, characterized by stronger state oversight compared to the more flexible approaches of the EU and United States.[102]

Unlike Western regulatory models that emphasize individual privacy and market-driven innovation, China's approach integrates technological development with its political philosophy, prioritizing collective interests and national strategic objectives.[103]

## 5. The Global South

Having examined emerging AI governance frameworks in the Global North, this paper now explores the regulatory landscape in the Global South. While the Global North leads in AI safety and governance, the trajectory in the Global South is markedly more complex and heterogeneous. Emerging economies across Africa, Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East demonstrate significantly varied progress, primarily due to their diverse technological ecosystems.

Many states in the Global South contend with substantial structural challenges, including limited digital infrastructure, technological access disparities, and resource constraints.[104] Consequently, their AI regulatory development appears comparatively nascent relative to Global North jurisdictions.[105] However, these regions are not passively responding but actively developing nuanced, context-specific regulatory approaches that balance technological ambition with ethical considerations and local resource limitations.

Notably, states are strategically employing hybrid regulatory mechanisms and leveraging AI to address critical sectoral needs such as healthcare, agricultural development, and educational enhancement. In Africa, countries like Mauritius, Egypt, and Kenya are emerging as regulatory

[97] Walter (n 69).
[98] Galceran-Vercher (n 59).
[99] ibid.
[100] ibid.
[101] ibid.
[102] Walter (n 69).
[103] ibid.
[104] Sorina Teleanu and Jovan Kurbalija, 'Stronger Digital Voices from Africa: Building African Digital Foreign Policy and Diplomacy' (DiploFoundation 2022) 129–134 <https://www.diplomacy.edu/resource/report-stronger-digital-voices-from-africa/ai-africa-national-policies/> accessed 1 January 2025.
[105] ibid.

pioneers, prioritizing innovation and developmental potential while acknowledging the need for robust governance frameworks.[106]

In Asia, nations such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia are progressively refining their AI regulatory approaches.[107] Similarly, the Middle East demonstrates remarkable dynamism, with countries like Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia establishing themselves as regional AI governance leaders.[108] These efforts suggest a nuanced understanding that effective regulation requires balancing innovation with responsible technological development.

In South America, the AI regulatory landscape presents a diverse and evolving picture.[109] Countries are at varying stages of developing comprehensive AI governance frameworks, with some nations emerging as regional leaders in technological innovation and regulatory approaches. Brazil stands out as a prominent AI policy leader in the region.[110] The country has been proactive in developing AI strategies, with the Brazilian Digital Strategy (Estratégia Brasileira de Inteligência Artificial) providing a foundational framework for AI development and governance.[111]

Argentina has also made significant strides, with government initiatives focusing on AI's potential for social and economic development. The country has been developing national AI strategies that emphasize innovation, ethical considerations, and potential applications in public services and critical sectors like healthcare and education.

Chile presents another interesting case, with government and academic institutions collaborating to create forward-thinking AI policies. The country has been investing in AI research and development, with a particular focus on using AI to address social challenges and promote technological innovation.[112]

Colombia is emerging as another key player, with efforts to develop AI capabilities and create regulatory frameworks that balance innovation with ethical considerations.[113] The government has been supporting AI initiatives in both the public and private sectors, recognizing the technology's potential for economic and social transformation.

However, the region faces significant challenges. Common obstacles include limited technological infrastructure, funding constraints, uneven digital literacy, and economic disparities that impact technological adoption.

Despite these challenges, South American countries are demonstrating a nuanced approach to AI governance.[114] Rather than simply importing frameworks from the Global North, these nations are developing context-specific strategies that reflect their unique social, economic, and technological landscapes.[115]

While significant disparities remain between Global North and Global South AI governance frameworks, the emerging landscape indicates a sophisticated, context-sensitive approach to

---

[106] ibid.
[107] Walter (n 69).
[108] ibid.
[109] ibid.
[110] ibid.
[111] Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovação, 'Estratégia Brasileira de Inteligência Artificial' (*Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações (Governo Federal)*) <https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/transformacaodigital/estrategia-brasileira-de-inteligencia-artificial> accessed 18 December 2025.
[112] Walter (n 69).
[113] ibid.
[114] ibid.
[115] ibid.

technological regulation. The potential for global regulatory harmonization exists, with Global South states potentially adapting and contextualizing frameworks from more established jurisdictions.

## 7. Uneven Regulation: Consequences for the Global North and South

The preceding section has highlighted some of the trends from states in relation to AI governance. While states have largely been bothered with creating their own AI regulatory path to promote AI development, these efforts, although necessary, are not enough in and of themselves to handle the full scope of challenges AI presents.[116] Our contemporary world is characterised by states' interconnectedness. Accordingly, a policy or decision taken in one state can advertently or inadvertently affect others.[117] For example, the development of an AI system can spread globally, leading to questions about privacy, bias and safety. Similarly, the policy decisions in one state or region can influence trade, innovation, or geopolitical dynamics elsewhere. The challenges affecting AI are unique because AI has far-reaching effects. As such, to tackle these challenges, states need to work together in order to maximise its benefits.

While a lot has been said about the importance of states' collaboration, it is important to bring to light the existing disparity and widening AI governance divide between the Global North and the Global South. From the brief analysis in the preceding section, it is clear that the rules that are already shaping the trajectory of AI globally are being set by a small number of states.[118] These states are primarily from the Global North and constitute the likes of the United States, China, EU states, etc. This growing disparity, if not addressed, holds grave consequences not just for the Global South, but for the aspiration of an effective global framework for AI governance.[119] Without perspectives from the global south, it will be difficult to argue in favour for the legitimacy of any global paradigm that arises, since whatever rules emanate will not be a representation of perspectives from the Global South entirely. This has the potential to hamper global progress on AI regulation. Besides, without the meaningful participation of developing states, AI technology's evolution will be primarily driven by states from the Global North and their commercial interests.[120] These risks exacerbating global inequalities and widening the technological gap between the Global North and Global South.

As has already been stated, the current AI governance landscape is marked by a competitive relationship, especially in light of the 'race to AI'.[121] Virtually all states emphasise strategies relating to the development, maintenance or strengthening of a position of 'leadership' in AI, often with reference to the positions of other states. If not careful, such a 'race to AI' can lead to states prioritising speed and dominance over quality, safety and ethical considerations. At its very worst, the current landscape may lead to what Ala-Pietilä and Smuha refer to as a zero-sum game, where one state's gain is another's loss.[122] The end result of a zero-sum game is that states will begin to act in their own self-interest, by thinking short-term or through

[116] Ala-Pietilä and Smuha (n 49) 6.
[117] ibid.
[118] LaForge, Muggah and Seiler (n 18) 5.
[119] ibid.
[120] ibid.
[121] European Commission – High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI HLEG), 'Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI' (European Commission (Digital Strategy – Shaping Europe's Digital Future) 2019) <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai> accessed 18 December 2024; Yuval Noah Harari, 'Who Will Win the Race for AI?' [2019] *Foreign Policy (The List / GT Essay)* <https://foreignpolicy.com/gt-essay/who-will-win-the-race-for-ai-united-states-china-data/> accessed 18 December 2024.
[122] Ala-Pietilä and Smuha (n 49) 7; James Carse, *Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life As Play and Possibility* (1st edition, Free Press 2023).

protectionist policies. For example, states may ignore potential negative effects like increased inequality or ethical breaches, or they may restrict the use of certain technologies or data, ignoring the global consequences.[123] Contrariwise, if states take an infinite perspective, there will be opportunity for cooperation, shared benefits and long-term growth. This will lead to a win-win situation in for everyone. [124]

While the priorities of the Global North currently may be focused on the misuses/risks of AI or challenges to the political or socioeconomic status quo, the Global South is faced with being excluded from the benefits of AI which could further widen global disparities in healthcare, education, economic development, and technological development. [125] This concern is particularly acute with the current existing divide that presents a barrier to technological equity. With about 2.7 billion people lacking internet access,[126] predominantly from areas in the Global South, the technological gap is already a critical source of global inequality. It is a compounding effect. Lack of basic digital infrastructure equals a limited economic growth as well as inaccessibility to technological advancements. Accordingly, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stated that, it is crucial to increase internet access and enable AI adoption in areas within the Global South to increase economic growth,[127] achieve sustainable development goals (SDGs) and reduce the gap between itself and the Global North.[128]

The Global South must develop its own distinct AI ecosystem rather than simply adopting solutions designed for different contexts.[129] The unique challenges, cultural nuances, and socioeconomic realities of developing nations require tailored approaches to AI development and governance. Technological policies, AI models, and regulatory frameworks created in the Global North often fail to address the specific needs and constraints of developing regions, as they emerge from fundamentally different social, economic, and technological contexts.[130]

Without locally developed AI systems and governance frameworks that reflect regional priorities and circumstances, there is a risk of implementing ill-fitting solutions that could prove ineffective or potentially harmful. This emphasizes the importance of building indigenous AI capabilities, fostering local talent, and creating regulatory frameworks that align with the specific development goals and cultural values of Global South nations. Until this is in place, it will be difficult to have a harmonised framework that truly reflects our unique challenges and diversity globally.

---

123 Ala-Pietilä and Smuha (n 49) 7.
124 ibid.
125 LaForge (n 55).
126 Landry Signé, 'Fixing the Global Digital Divide and Digital Access Gap' (2023) <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/fixing-the-global-digital-divide-and-digital-access-gap/> accessed 21 December 2024.
127 IMF, 'Digitalizing Sub-Saharan Africa: Hopes and Hurdles' (*IMF*) <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/15/na061520-digitalizing-sub-saharan-africa-hopes-and-hurdles> accessed 21 December 2024.
128 United Nations – General Assembly Second Committee, 'Widening Digital Gap between Developed, Developing States Threatening to Exclude World's Poorest from Next Industrial Revolution, Speakers Tell Second Committee' (*United Nations Meetings Coverage and Press Releases*, 6 October 2023) <https://press.un.org/en/2023/gaef3587.doc.htm> accessed 23 December 2024.
129 Robert Muggah LaForge Gabriella Seiler and Gordon, 'AI and the Global South | by Robert Muggah, Gabriella Seiler and Gordon LaForge' (*Project Syndicate*, 2 March 2023) <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ai-governance-first-principles-must-include-global-south-by-robert-muggah-et-al-2023-03> accessed 23 December 2024.
130 ibid.

## 8. A Case for Inclusive Power Sharing in Global AI Governance

From the preceding section, there is currently a great imbalance in AI governance globally. Most policies, standards, models, guidelines and rules surrounding the development, deployment and use of AI systems predominantly emerge from a handful of nations in the Global North, particularly the United States and Europe. These nations hold the power to shape the digital landscape, influence global narratives, and reap the economic benefits of the digital economy. They are also increasingly determining how AI systems are developed and used worldwide.

This dynamic which sees the Global North as a powerhouse can be described as the coloniality of power in AI governance.[131] The coloniality of power refers to how colonial power structures and hierarchies continue to influence current global relations, even after formal colonisation has ended.[132] In essence, it constitutes a modern analogue of colonialism, in which authority and influence are exercised not through physical occupation, but through the regulation and exploitation of digital technologies and the infrastructures that sustain them. The exclusion of the Global South from important technological decisions can be seen as a continuation of these historical power dynamics.

The technological divide does not reflect differences in capability or aspiration, but rather emerges from deeply rooted structural inequalities that have historically advantaged the Global North.[133] This form of "colonialism" is evident in various ways. One significant aspect is the control of essential platforms by leading tech corporations based in the Global North, such as social media networks, search engines, cloud computing services, and e-commerce platforms.[134] This dominance enables the Global North to shape global communication, control information flow, and influence economic exchanges.[135] Additionally, data produced by users in the Global South is frequently stored and processed on servers located in the Global North. This situation raises critical concerns regarding privacy, data sovereignty, and the disproportionate economic advantages gained through data analysis and monetization.[136] Lastly, a key issue pertains to AI governance, where the Global North is establishing global standards and norms that may not reflect the priorities or values of the Global South.[137]

The rise of 'inclusive AI Governance' as a phenomenon is a critical turning point in AI governance globally.[138] Without meaningful participation from the Global South in shaping the rules and standards that govern AI, there is a risk of amplifying global power imbalances. The effectiveness of AI governance increasingly depends on global participation as AI capabilities spread beyond traditional centres of innovation. Early inclusion of the Global South in AI governance discussions is not merely desirable but a strategic imperative to prevent future governance failures. Inclusive global dialogue facilitates international alliances, enriches expertise through diverse perspectives, and ensures governance frameworks reflect worldwide realities rather than narrow regional interests.

---

[131] Anibal Quijano and Michael Ennis, 'Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America' (2000) 1 Nepantla: Views from South 533, 533–580; Png (n 29) 1441–1442.
[132] Quijano and Ennis (n 131) 533.
[133] Png (n 29) 1441.
[134] Robert Atkinson, 'Digital Colonialism 2.0: How AI Is Deepening Global Inequities | LinkedIn' (20 September 2024) <https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/digital-colonialism-20-how-ai-deepening-global-robert-atkinson-6oxac/> accessed 29 December 2024.
[135] ibid.
[136] ibid.
[137] ibid.
[138] Png (n 29) 1435.

One of the reasons why the Global North may prefer to relate amongst themselves is because it may be easier to agree on complex regulations. This is particularly, appealing given the concentrated nature of AI development, where some states in the Global North dominate the creation of cutting-edge AI technologies.[139] The logic behind this exclusive approach suggests that since most advanced AI systems originate from a small number of countries, coordinating regulations among just these key players could theoretically address the majority of immediate global risks. However, this perspective overlooks the broader implications of AI deployment and its impacts on diverse global communities, potentially creating blind spots in governance frameworks.[140]

Historical examples demonstrate the pitfalls of exclusionary approaches to global governance. The failure of initiatives like the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI)[141] and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA),[142] despite being led by major economies like the UK and US, stemmed largely from mistrust among excluded nations.[143] A similar pattern of exclusion in AI governance could generate comparable scepticism and resistance, ultimately undermining global cooperation efforts.

The stakes of exclusion extend beyond mere participation. A governance vacuum in the Global South creates opportunities for strategic competition, as evidenced by China's growing influence through initiatives like the Belt and Road and the establishment of AI working groups within the BRICS alliance.[144] Moreover, inclusive governance frameworks better anticipate and address challenges across diverse regional, cultural, and socioeconomic contexts, creating truly global standards that serve all nations' interests.

The ethical dimension of inclusion is particularly crucial given the global impact of AI systems. Technologies developed in the Global North have worldwide implications – whether in spreading misinformation, exhibiting biases, affecting employment, or raising safety concerns.[145] Equally, the potential benefits of AI in areas like productivity, education, and healthcare could benefit all nations with appropriate support and infrastructure.[146] While practical challenges exist in implementing inclusive governance, the ethical imperative of including nations in decisions that profoundly affect their futures cannot be ignored.

## 9. Concluding Reflections

The dominance of the Global North in technological advancements and AI governance reveals the ongoing coloniality of power, wherein decision-making and resource control remain skewed. This has led to an imbalance that has marginalised the Global South and perpetuated

---

[139] Sumaya Nur Adan, 'The Case for Including the Global South in AI Governance Discussions' (*GovAI (Governance.ai)*, 20 October 2023) <https://www.governance.ai/post/the-case-for-including-the-global-south-in-ai-governance-conversations> accessed 28 December 2024.

[140] ibid.

[141] UNCTAD (ed), *Lessons from the MAI* (United Nations 1999).

[142] European Parliament. Directorate General for External Policies of the Union. and Maastricht University Institute for Globalisation and International Regulation (IGIR), *The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) :An Assessment.* (Publications Office 2011) <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/13090> accessed 30 December 2024.

[143] Adan (n 139).

[144] James McBride, Noah Berman and Andrew Chatzky, 'China's Massive Belt and Road Initiative' (*Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)*, 2 February 2023) <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative> accessed 30 December 2024; Digital Watch, 'BRICS Announces Formation of AI Study Group' (*Digital Watch Observatory*, 23 August 2023) <https://dig.watch/updates/brics-members-announce-formation-of-ai-study-group> accessed 30 December 2024.

[145] Adan (n 139).

[146] ibid.

systemic inequities in data ownership, privacy, and economic benefits. As AI continues to pervade societies and shape global frameworks, the Global South cannot continue to be ignored. If there is to be a global approach to the risks and dangers posed by AI systems, there must be an inclusive approach to AI governance. The Global South, with its unique contexts, diverse values, priorities and needs must be accounted for if we are ever to achieve an equitable AI governance.

AI is all encompassing and is rapidly becoming the brainbox of economic growth, decision making, and social development. Consequently, the stakes are too high to keep repeating historical patterns of exclusion, since AI will shape the future of all nations. In order to bridge this existing gap, the Global North must begin to pay attention to the lived experiences of the Global South, which shapes the needs of the world's largest populations. This can be done by ensuring a genuine participation and representation from the Global South, not merely their symbolic representation. Accordingly, resources for capacity building, technical expertise development, and infrastructural support must be granted to ensure meaningful participation from states in the Global South. Additionally, governance frameworks must take cognisance of diverse perspectives, challenges and needs. There must be a move away from the western-centric approach to governance and recognise other socioeconomic contexts and approaches, as well as the development goals of different regions. Moreover, the development of indigenous AI ecosystems in the Global South must be supported to facilitate technological transfer in a way that encourages local capacity, as opposed to creating new forms of dependency.

It is only through a genuine collaboration between the Global North and South that governance frameworks that serve the interests of all humanity rather than continuing the cycle North-centric dominance that overlooks local diversity and context. Notwithstanding, the Global South must take necessary actions to invest in AI research and development, including local digital infrastructures.[147] They must develop the necessary political infrastructure to aid in passing effective and efficient AI policies for their populace.[148] The Global South must also work to engage with global AI policy efforts from the Global North to promote the interests of the Global South.[149] It may also be highly beneficial for the Global South to form regional initiatives that promote AI policy design and development from the understanding of their common contexts and challenges.[150]

[147] Institute (n 1) 13.
[148] ibid.
[149] ibid.
[150] ibid.